Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) Methodology Works under Monopolistic Competition by Sergio DeSouza
Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) Methodology Works under
Monopolistic Competition 
Sergio DeSouza
Universidade Federal do Ceara
Abstract
Markups, returns to scale and productivity can be uncovered from regressing output on
inputs. However, econometric identification of theses parameters may be problematic due the
simultaneity problem. A common solution is the IV method. However, usual instruments are
only weakly correlated to the explanatory variables. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose
using a commonly observable variable (intermediate input) to control for unobserved
productivity. Their methodology is based on the following key result: under the assumption
of perfect competition, the intermediate input’s demand function is a monotonic function of
productivity. However, firms in most industries enjoy some degree of market power such that
perfect competition may not be a desirable assumption for most empirical studies. This paper
contributes to the literature by showing the monotonicity condition holds under monopolistic
competition.
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Identification of production functions has played an important role in 
applied economics. Indeed, meaningful parameters (markups, returns to scale and 
productivity) can be uncovered from a regression of output on inputs. The seminal 
contribution of Marschak and Andrews (1944) however points out that econometric 
identification of these parameters may be problematic due to the potential correlation 
between inputs and productivity. It is a straightforward exercise to demonstrate that 
this correlation yields biased OLS estimates. 
A common solution to this problem is to treat productivity as a time-
invariant term and use the within estimator. Unfortunately, the assumption of 
productivity as a fixed effect may be quite restrictive, especially for panels with a 
relatively large time dimension. Another approach is to difference the variables and 
use lagged inputs as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 2000). However, differencing 
removes much of the variation in the explanatory variables and instruments are only 
weakly correlated with the differenced explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2005).    
In the absence of good instruments applied economists started searching 
for alternative methods to deal with the simultaneity problem. Leading this recent 
literature Olley and Pakes (1996) -OP from now on- propose an innovative technique 
that avoids the difficult task of searching for instruments. They use an observed 
variable (investment) to proxy unobserved productivity. Another approach was 
developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2000)-LP hereafter. They argue that the 
necessity to drop zero-investments observations, as required by the OP methodology, 
raises an estimation efficiency issue. Indeed, in commonly found data sets, especially 
those covering developing countries, the application of the investment proxy 
approach requires dropping many zero-investment data points. For instance, in the 
Chilean firm-level data set, used by LP, over one-half of the sample reports zero 
investment. This zero-investment problem may be evidence of a more fundamental 
issue. LP argues that if the zeros are the result of adjustment costs that lead to kink 
points in the demand function, plants may not entirely respond to productivity shocks 
such that the endogeneity problem can remain.       
Following a similar approach but using a different variable to control for 
unobserved productivity LP devise an alternative framework. Their methodology can 
be briefly described as follows. First, they derive the intermediate input’s demand 
function, which under certain assumptions is a monotonic function of productivity. 
Then, with the monotonicity condition at hand, they are able to invert the 
intermediate input’s demand function to uncover the unobservable productivity term 
as a non-parametric function of the intermediate input and capital. In this way, the 
only unobservable error term left in the estimation is not expected to be correlated 
with the regressors. Note also that the LP technique is analytically much simpler than 
OP. Unlike investment, the intermediate input is a flexible variable. Then a simple 
static setup suffices to derive the monotonicity condition. In turn, OP have to 
incorporate dynamics to account for capital adjustments costs to prove that 
productivity is a monotonic function of investment. This is certainly not a trivial 
exercise.  
 
1 In many data sets firms almost always report positive use of intermediate 
inputs. In such cases, the LP methodology becomes the natural choice. Although this 
methodology avoids some of the problems caused by the investment proxy it 
introduces a new one. As described in further detail in the following section, they 
assume perfect competition in order to derive the monotonicity condition. This 
assumption contrasts with the fact that firms in most industries enjoy some degree of 
market power. This paper contributes to the literature by relaxing the assumption of 
perfect competition and showing that the LP procedure can also be applied to study 
imperfectly competitive industries
1. This paper is organized as follows. The next 
section briefly discusses the LP procedure and, more importantly, demonstrates the 
following result: aside from some regularity assumptions, the monotonicity condition 
holds under a particular form of imperfect competition. Section 3 shows an example 
that illustrates the usefulness of this result. Finally, the last section provides some 
concluding remarks and suggestions of future work.  
 
2. Monotonicity Condition under Monopolistic Competition 
 
In this section I demonstrate that the monotonicity condition is valid under 
the assumption of monopolistic competition. But first let me briefly explain how the 
LP methodology works.  
Assume the inputs available to firm i are: freely variable inputs (labor, Lit, 
and intermediate input, Mit) and a quasi-fixed input (capital, Kit). These inputs are 
transformed into output (Qit ) according to the following production function. 
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where  Θ is a set of parameters and the error term has two additively separable 
components: Wit and Nit. The former term is the productivity shock observed by firms 
before they choose optimal labor and intermediate input levels, while the latter is an 
i.i.d random shock
2. 
                                                 
1 Ackerberg et al. (2005) point out another problem with the LP approach. They argue that in the same 
way intermediate input is a function of productivity so is labor. Then, in a typical production function 
regression where the variable inputs appear on the RHS a colinearity problem arises, casting doubt on 
the parameters estimation. Further, they develop a method does not suffer from this colinearity 
problem, but they also use the monotonicity condition in (2) to control for unobservable productivity.  
Thus, this paper’s result also broadens the set of assumptions on competition under which their 
methodology works. 
2 The first term is a state variable affecting firm’s decisions while the second term has no impact on 
firm’s controls. Olley and Pakes (1996) interpret the Nit as a shock to productivity that is unobserved 
by firms during the period in which the flexible inputs levels are optimized.    
 
2The basic idea behind LP is to proxy unobserved productivity with an 
observable variable. One candidate for such proxy is Mit. Note that the intermediate 
input’s demand function is given as
3
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If this function is strictly monotonic in Wit  one can invert it, conditional 
on capital, i.e.  .  This is the key result that supports the LP 
framework. Indeed, if monotonicity holds one can substitute W
) , ( it it it it K M W W =
it  for   in 
(1). Thus, the production function regression contains only observables and an error 
term,  N
) , ( it it it K M W
it, which is not correlated with the inputs. Then, LP devise a two-step 
algorithm to estimate the parameters. For more details see their original work. In this 
work, I am rather interested in the assumptions that support the monotonicity result 
and the limitations they may impose on empirical studies. For notational simplicity I 
will drop the time subscripts from now on.  
LP show that the intermediate input demand function is strictly increasing 
in Wi, conditional on K i, if the following assumptions hold: 
 
Assumption 1. Capital is quasi-fixed (i.e., capital is a state variable) and the 
controls (intermediate input and labor) are determined after the firm observes 
the productivity shock. Factor markets are competitive and factor prices are 
common across firms. 
 
Assumption 2.  Firm i transforms inputs into output according to the 
following production technology
4  . This 
function is twice continuously differentiable in L and M, and   and 
 exist for all values
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Assumption 3. Firm i takes the output prices for the homogeneous good as 
given.  
 
Assumption 4. The following inequality holds everywhere 
 
0 > − LL MW ML LW F F F F  
    
The first assumption lays out the standard hypothesis on how inputs are 
optimally determined. Assumption 2 imposes standard regularity conditions on the 
production function. Assumption 3 essentially says that each firm is a price-taker and 
therefore faces a flat residual (inverse) demand curve - demand price elasticity is 
                                                 
3 LP assume that output and input prices are common across firms. Therefore, these prices do not show 
up in (2). 
4 As in LP, I omit Nit from the production function technology for notational simplicity. This will not 
influence the results.  
 
3infinite. Finally, assumption 4 imposes an extra restriction on the production function 
derivatives. 
 
Assumption 3 is certainly the most restrictive one, since many industries 
present some degree of product differentiation and market power. However, 
loosening assumption 3 is not such a simple task. In a perfectly competitive 
environment the monotonicity result is straightforward. With fixed output and input 
prices an increase in productivity implies higher output, which in turn implies higher 
demand for the intermediate input. In the context of imperfect competition this 
monotonicity property may no longer hold as firms realize that prices decrease as 
output goes up. Therefore, whether or not the intermediate input use increases as 
productivity goes up will also depend on the price sensitivity of consumers (i.e., 
demand elasticity). This is where this paper contribution comes in.  I show that, under 
a certain form of imperfect competition, the monotonicity result is valid. To do so I 
impose the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 3’.  
 
(a) Each firm produces a differentiated good. 
(b) Each Firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for its 
differentiated product.  
(c) A quantity change by one firm has a negligible effect on the price of 
any other firm.   
(d) The price elasticity, define here as – σi (where σi >1), is constant along 
each firm’s residual demand. 
 
Assumption 3’(a) to 3’(c) describes the market configuration known as 
monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933). In this market environment, firms are 
too small to influence market aggregates but still retain some market power due to 
product differentiation. Therefore each firm behaves as a monopoly on its downward 
sloping (residual) demand curve. Further, I assume the demand price elasticity is 
constant (see 3’(d)). Tirole (1988) shows that the constant price elasticity property 
can be obtained from a monopolistic competitive setup where a representative 
consumer has a CES utility function for the differentiated goods.
5
                                                 
5 More specifically, Tirole makes the following assumptions:  each monopolistic competitive firm 



























, where  is an outside good. It is simple to show that the 
elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to σ. Then consumer optimization implies the following 
residual demand for each firm i: , where k is a constant. Notice that demand price elasticity 
is constant and equal to – σ. Further, market clearing yields a formula for the price cost markup, which 
is given as σ/(σ-1). This setup gives an intuitively appealing interpretation. As the degree of product 
substitutability increases (i.e. σ increases) the demand function becomes flatter and firms lose market 
0 Q
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Assumption 4’.  The following inequality holds everywhere 
0 ) ) ( (
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       (3) 
         Assumption 4’ imposes an extra restriction on the production function and the 
demand elasticity. Note that the two assumptions above generalize assumption 3 and 
4. Indeed, as we approach the competitive outcome, i.e. σ→∞, assumptions 3’and 4’ 
become assumption 3 and 4. Now, I have the tools to show that the monotonicity 
condition works under imperfect competition.   
Result.  If assumptions 1,2, 3’and 4’ hold then the intermediate input demand 
function, , is strictly increasing in W ) , ( i i i K W M i. 
 
Proof.  Firm i maximizes the following objective function with respect to Li and 
Mi: 
 
i K i M i L i i i K r M r L r Q Q P − − − . ). ( 
 
) ( i i Q P  is the inverse demand for firm i’s product, rj is the return to factor j 
and . Thus, dropping the subscripts indexing firms, one can 
write the first order conditions as  
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where Fj is the derivative of F with respect to factor j. Take the derivative of both 
sides of (4) with respect to W.  Notice that the RHS of (4) is invariant to changes 
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which can be written in terms of the demand elasticity as follows 
 
                                                                                                                                             
power. In the extreme case, σ→∞, there is no product differentiation, firms become price-takers and 










































; j=L,M.        (6) 
 

















































M MM L M ML














































































M MM L M ML
M L LM L LL
MW W M L M ML




























The matrix in the denominator is the Hessian of the objective function. Thus, 
maximizing behavior implies that this matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. the 
determinant of the Hessian is positive. From assumption 4’, the numerator, which 
is given as 
) ) ( (
1 2
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Q
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σ
, is 




Inequality (3) is simple (although tedious) to verify for any given production 
function. In fact, it is comforting to know that it holds, as I checked, for very familiar 
production functions as the CES and the Cobb-Douglas. It should be stressed that this 
paper’s result does not alter the LP method. Rather, it broadens the set of assumptions 
under which the intermediate input proxy approach works. 
 
3. An Example  
 
In this section, I provide an example commonly found in the literature in order 
to highlight the problems caused by the assumption of perfect competition. This 
example also serves the purpose of illustrating the usefulness of this paper result. 
Measuring market power and productivity using plant-level data has been the object 
of many applied studies in industrial organization and trade (see the papers cited 
below).  
 
6In a seminal work, Hall (1990) shows that if capital is quasi-fixed and factor 
markets are competitive for the freely variable inputs then the log differentiated 
production function (1) can be written as 
i i i iM i i iL i i e K d M d K d L d K d q d + − + − + = )) ln ln ( ) ln ln ( ( ln ln α α µ γ                   (7) 
where ei is an additively separable error term (productivity plus an i.i.d  
random variable) and αij is the cost share of input j relative to firm i’s total revenue.  
The specification above is consistent with the fact that capital is costly to adjust (i.e. 
capital is a state variable) and allows for the simultaneous estimation of returns to 
scale (γ), price-cost markup (µ), and productivity.  
A number of researchers have used (7) to uncover the economically 
relevant parameters. Examples
6 include Harrison (1994) and Klette (1999). They 
differ in their solution to the simultaneity problem. The former author uses within 
estimator while the latter author uses an IV approach similar to the one developed by 
Blundell and Bond (2000). As mentioned in the introductory section these 
methodologies have a few shortcomings. Olley and Pakes offer a methodology that 
circumvents some of these problems but requires that zero-investment observations 
be removed from the data set. This requirement may significantly reduce the 
information available to the econometrician as zero-investment observations are a 
common feature in many data sets.   
Hence, if one is not willing to lose a big chunk of the data set (and 
therefore reduce efficiency) and wants to avoid the standard approaches (within and 
IV estimators) inference problems, LP becomes the natural choice. However, notice 
that firm’s optimizing behavior implies that the price-cost ratio is equal to ) 1 /( − σ σ , 
where  σ −  is the residual demand price elasticity. But in perfect competition this 
elasticity is infinite and, consequently, µ is one. Thus, findings of price-cost markups 
above one and the resulting productivity estimates are inconsistent with LP’s 
assumption of perfect competition.  
However, using the previous section’s result it is possible to “fix” this 
consistency problem. Indeed, if one is willing to assume monopolistic competition 
and constant price elasticity, then assumption 3’ is satisfied and, provided that 
assumptions 1, 2 and 4’ are also satisfied, the monotonicity condition follows from 
the result derived in the previous section. Hence, the LP procedure (the inversion of 
the intermediate input demand function and the two-step algorithm) can be applied to 
estimate (7) without any inconsistencies.  
                                                 
6 Another example that is closely related to the discussion in this section is Klette and Griliches (1996). 
They estimate equation (7) and assume monopolistic competition. However, as their focus was on the 
bias caused by unobserved price heterogeneity. They applied an IV approach to deal with the 
simultaneity bias. 
 
74. Final Remarks 
     
This paper provides a useful result for researchers interested in estimating 
production function parameters and markups using the LP framework. For, the 
monotonicity result developed here relaxes the perfect competition assumption 
imposed in the original LP paper. Indeed, this result guarantees consistency between a 
particular form of imperfect competition (monopolistic competition) and the LP 
procedure.  
It is true that in some instances monopolistic competition may not be 
appropriate to model imperfect competition. However, the assumptions underlying 
monopolistic competition are certainly less restrictive than the ones underlying 
perfect competition. In this way, this paper can be viewed as a first step towards 
generalizing the monotonicity result. A natural extension of this work is to show that 
this result is robust to other forms of imperfect competition like Cournot and 
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